Ryan Q. Hodges v. Reese S. Howel; and Salt Lake Mortgage Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Ryan Q. Hodges v. Reese S. Howel; and Salt Lake
Mortgage Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Erik A. Christiansen; James T. Blanch; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Howell.
Barry N. Johnson; Daniel L. Steele; Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere, LLC; Attorneys for Hodges.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hodges v. Howell, No. 990606 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2256
IN Till, UTAH (OUR I OI< APPLAI S 
lO AM 11. IIOIHilS ,II liMilual 
PlainlifT-Appdlant, 
REESE S. ! iOWELL, an individual, 
line \ I T f,AKE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. 





Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 1 2 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Appeal No. 990606-CA 
District Case No. 9809105 
Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPIl I ANT RYAN Q. HODGES 
Appeal from the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Erik A. Christiansen (7372) 
James T. Blanch (6494) 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Reese S. Howell 
. . . , ^ . » «• •
 % < w : > ; 
Daniel L. 5U'-:/ -MVo 
Bennett TucIk-: J-••!»!:->r. .v h •-;< 
3865 S. Wasauh Bh<' . MUU, J\)V 
Salt Lake City, « i *4.»»» 
Attorneys for Ryan Q. Hodges 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RYAN Q. HODGES, an individual 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
REESE S. HOWELL, an individual, 
and SALT LAKE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. 





Erik A. Christiansen (7372) 
James T. Blanch (6494) 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Reese S. Howell 
Appeal No. 990606-CA 
District Case No. 980910505 
Argument Priority 15 
Barry N. Johnson (6255) 
Daniel L. Steele (6336) 
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere, LLC 
3865 S. Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorneys for Ryan Q. Hodges 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT RYAN Q. HODGES 
Appeal from the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
l 'Hodges") is th- ntiff/appell >«• • t 
Reese S. Howell ("Howell") is the defendant/appellee. There are no other parties to 
this appeal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Brief of Appellant 
Page 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review and Standard of Review . . . 1 
Determinative Statutes 3 
Statement of the Case 5 
Summary of Argument 10 
Argument 12 
A. HODGES' CLAIM FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS 
IS NOT GOVERNED BY THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FOR SEDUCTION 12 
1. The tort of AOA is not a specified tort 
under the one-year statute of limitations 
found at §78-12-29(4), and the tort of 
seduction is not at all related to the tort of 
AOA 12 
2. The tort of AOA is subject to the four-year 
statute of limitations found at Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25 because it is not specifically 
enumerated in section 78-12-29 19 
B. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS 
TO WHEN HODGES' AOA CLAIM ACCRUED 
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 22 
iii 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED 
TO MAKE DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT TO 
SUPPORT AND OUTLINE ITS DECISION THAT 
HODGES' AOA CLAIMS ACCRUED MORE THAN 
ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE FILING OF HIS 
COMPLAINT 27 
VII. Conclusion 28 
VIII. Certificate of Service via First Class Mail 30 
IX. Addendum 31 
IV 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Brief of Appellant 
Cases 
Page 
Andreini v. Hultgress. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) 25 
Bassett v. Bassett. 20 111. App. 543 (111. 1886) 21 
Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) 2 
Bowers v. Carter. 59 Utah 249, 250-51, 202 P. 1093, 1094-95 
(Utah 1921) 10,14,15 
Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d425, 433-34 (Utah 1999) 3 
Farrow v. Roderique. 224 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. App. 1949) 21 
Gibson v. Gibson. 402 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Ark. 1968) 21, 22, 24, 25 
Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 2.Pd 1234 1242 (Utah 1998), 
cert denied, 119 S.CT. 1803 (1999) 27 
Klingerv. Kightly. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) 2 
Loomerv.Rittinger. 789 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ky.App. 1989) 25 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207. 1217 (Utah 1983^ 11,13-15,17 
Norton v. Macfarlane. 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991) 10, 11, 13, 15, 16 
Olsen v. Hooley. 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993) 20, 22, 23 
Owns v. Garfield. 784P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989) 2 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d, 949, 975 
(Utah 1992) 20, 23 IV 
Ruckerv.Dalton 598 P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah 1979) 27 
Schwartz v. Valinskv. 294 N.E.2d 446,447 (Mass. App 1973) 21 
Slawekv.Stroh. 215 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Wis. 1974) 16 
Smith v. Lyon. 9 Ohio App 141 (Ohio 1918) 21 
Tolman v. K-Mart Utah. Enterprises of Utah. Inc.. 650 P.2d 1127, 1128 
(Utah 1997) 19 
Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Advance Reports 45, 46 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1999) 27 
Wilson v.Oldrovd. 1 Utah 2d 362, 372-74, 267 P.2d 759, 767-68 
(Utah 1954) 24 
Wilson v. Valley Mental Health 969 P.2d 416. 418 (Utah 1998) 2 
Winegarv.FroererCorp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991) 22 
Woodman v. Goodrich. 234 Wis. 565, 291 N.W. 768, 769 (Wis. 1940) 21 
Woodward v.Fazzio. 823 P.2d474 (Ut. Ct. App 1991) 3 
Statutes. Rules and Other Related Authorities 
Statutes 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5 (1998) 4, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-6 (1998) 4, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10 (1998) 4, 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (1998) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1998) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-4(1998) 10, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-5 (1998) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1998) 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (1998) 17 
V 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1998) 4, 6, 18-21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1998) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 (1998) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29 (1998) 1, 3,4, 6, 7,12, 13,18-20 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1998) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-12 (1998) 22 
Rules 
Page 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) (1999 as amended) 1 
vi 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
I. Statement of Jurisdiction 
Hodges appeals the final order dismissing his claims against Howell as signed 
by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on June 16, 1999. (R. at 210). Rule 54(b) 
certification was not necessary as the June 16, 1999 order dismissed all remaining 
claims between the parties.1 Hodges timely filed a Notice of Appeal on July 12, 
1999.2 There are no pending claims, post judgment motions or parties before the trial 
court. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
II. Statement of the Issues Presented for Review and Standard of Review 
Two issues are presented for review. 
First, did the trial court err when it held that the one-year statute of 
limitations for seduction found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (1996) also 
1
 A previous order dated March 8, 1999 dismissed Hodges' claims against 
Howell's company and the employer of Hodges' wife, namely Salt Lake Mortgage 
Company. (R. at 104). The June 16, 1999 order not only dismissed Hodges' remaining 
claims but also dismissed the third party complaint filed by Howell and Salt Lake 
Mortgage Company which sought to compare the fault of Linda Hodges. These two 
orders together dismissed the matter in its entirety and both are attached as Exhibit "A" to 
the Addendum of this brief. 
2
 A copy of Hodges' Notice of Appeal is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Addendum 
of this brief. 
1 
applies to alienation of affection claims even though the tort of alienation of 
affections is not specifically enumerated therein. 
Second, did the trial court err in granting Howell's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when it determined that there were no genuine disputes as to any of the 
material facts associated with the question of when Hodges' claim for alienation 
of affections accrued and further failed to make findings of fact which would 
support its ruling that Hodges' claim for alienation of affections accrued more 
than one year prior to the filing of his complaint. 
On appeal, the question of whether summary judgment is appropriate is a 
question of law. Consequently, no deference is given to the trial court's decision. 
The same is true for the trial court's determination of which statute of limitation 
applies to a particular cause of action. Therefore, these issues are examined for 
correctness. See Wilson v. Vallev Mental Health. 969 P.2d 416,418 (Utah 1998); 
Klingerv.Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). 
The trial court's findings of fact are given deference and reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard keeping in mind that the facts must be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1989V see also Owns v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187,1188 (Utah 1989). On 
appeal, a party challenging the trial court's findings of fact must fully and 
accurately marshall the facts adverse to his or her position and demonstrate that 
2 
the evidence did not support such a conclusion. Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 
433-34 (Utah 1998). The adequacy of a trial court's findings of fact must be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough facts to show the evidence upon which 
they are grounded. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Ut. Ct. App 1991). 
Inadequate findings of fact warrant remand for more detailed findings. kL at 478. 
Hodges preserved these arguments in his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment where he argued that the residual four-
year statute of limitations applies to his alienation of affection claims. (R. at 166-
89). He likewise argued that material questions of fact existed regarding when his 
claim for alienation of affections accrued such that summary judgment was not 
proper. Id 
III. Determinative Statutes 
The trial court accepted Howell's arguments that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
29(4) (1996), which establishes a one-year statute of limitations for the tort of 
seduction, also applies to alienation of affections claims. Section 78-12-
29(4)(1996) provides as follows: 
An action may be brought within one year: 
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state; 
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given 
to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the 
statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation; 
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(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a 
forfeiture or penalty to the state; 
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction: 
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner 
arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process; 
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property 
caused by a mob or riot; 
(7) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following 
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits 
the time for action to four-years, under Section 25-6-10; or 
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2). 
(Emphasis added). Hodges argues that § 78-12-29(4) is not applicable to a claim 
for alienation of affections and, instead, asserts that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (3) 
establishes the statute of limitations applicable to alienation of affection claims. It 
states as follows: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on 
an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials 
furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made 
or the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following 
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits 
the time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
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(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
(Emphasis added). Copies of these two statutes are attached as Exhibit "C" to the 
Addendum of this brief for the convenience of the Court and counsel. There are 
no other statutes or cases in Utah which are determinative of the issues presented 
for review. 
IV. Statement of the Case 
This litigation arises out of the purposeful and predatory conduct of Howell 
wherein he pursued the affections of Linda Hodges, the then wife of Hodges and 
mother of his children.3 Knowing full well that Linda Hodges was married to 
Hodges, Howell, through his money and position of power as Linda Hodges' 
employer, succeeded in his pursuit of Linda Hodges which led to an illicit affair 
and the eventual breakup of the Hodges' marriage and family through divorce. To 
this day, Howell and Linda Hodges are a couple and share between themselves the 
most intimate of affections. (R. at 167-71). 
Linda Hodges eventually filed for divorce and the divorce was finalized on 
February 4, 1998. (R. at 169,171). Thereafter, Hodges filed suit against Howell 
and his company, Salt Lake Mortgage Company, on October 20, 1998, alleging 
that Howell's intentional pursuit of Linda Hodges during her marriage to Hodges 
3Ryan and Linda Hodges were married on April 14,1983. They had three children 
during their marriage ~ Megan, Daks and Madison. (R. at 167, n. 1) 
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constituted a purposeful effort to secure her affections and, at the same time, 
alienate her affections towards Hodges. (R. at 1-7). Hodges' principal cause of 
action against Howell is the tort of alienation of affections ("AOA"). IcL 
Howell moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations 
found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (1996) which establishes a one-year 
limitations period for the tort of seduction, not AOA. (R. at 111-61). Howell 
further argued that the facts showed that Hodges knew that his relationship with 
his wife and her affections for him were irretrievably broken by January 20,1997. 
(K at 1J 6-J 7). Applying this fact to the alleged one-year statute of limitations, 
argued Howell, demonstrated that the deadline for Hodges to file his AOA claim 
was January 20,1998. Thus, Hodges complaint, which was filed on October 20, 
1998, was untimely and barred by the one-year statute of limitations for the tort of 
seduction. (R. at 117-20). 
Hodges opposed Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 166-89). 
Hodges argued that the statute of limitations for the tort of seduction does not 
apply to the tort of AOA because AOA is unrelated — in every way - to the tort of 
seduction. Hodges argued further that the applicable statute of limitations for his 
AOA claim is Utah's four-year residual or "catch-all" statute of limitation found at 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1996). (R. at 177-79). 
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Hodges also disputed Howell's "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" 
and set forth additional facts which demonstrated that genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to when his cause of action for AOA accrued — even if the one-year 
statute of limitations applied. (R. at 179-80). 
The trial court granted Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment based on 
the briefs filed by the parties and without conducting oral argument on the matter. 
The trial court held that the one-year statute of limitations for the tort of seduction 
enumerated at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) also applies to claims for AOA. The 
tria] court further ruled that the facts demonstrated that Hodges' AOA cause of 
action accrued more than one-year prior to the filing of his complaint. In its 
minute entry, the trial court did not acknowledge or address the facts submitted by 
Hodges in opposition to Howell's motion for summary judgment; nor did it make 
any findings of fact as to when Hodges' AOA cause of action accrued. Instead, 
the trial court simply stated that Hodges' AOA claim accrued more than one year 
prior to the filing of his complaint on October 20, 1999. (R. at 208; see also Order 
and Final Judgment, R. at 211, Tf 1). 
A. Statement of Facts 
In support of his position that the trial court erred when it determined 
that his cause of action for AOA accrued more than one year prior to the filing of 
his complaint, Hodges marshalls the following pertinent facts demonstrating that 
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genuine issues of material fact exist as to when his cause of action for AOA 
accrued for statute of limitations purposes. 
1. Ryan and Linda Hodges were married on April 14, 1983. (R. at 
113). 
2. In the Fall of 1995, Hodges learned of his wife's ongoing friendship 
with Howell and that it was beginning to impact the Hodges' marriage. (R. at 
113-14,153-54). 
3. The Hodges remained together through the majority of 1996. 
However, in the late Fall of 1996 they separated for a period of time. (R. at 114, 
140-41). 
4. The Hodges reconciled and resumed living together in December of 
1996. (R. at 140). 
5. On January 20,1997, Hodges saw his wife with Howell and was 
concerned that their marriage may be headed for divorce rather than 
reconciliation. (R. at 116, 142). In fact, he stated that he knew they were going to 
get a divorce at that time. (Id) 
6. Even though Hodges moved out of their home shortly thereafter, 
Hodges had not made up his mind to seek a divorce and he still held out hope that 
he and his wife would reconcile and that she would consider terminating her 
relationship with Howell. (R. at 143-45). 
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7. In fact, the Hodges attended marriage counseling sessions together in 
late 1996 and in the first quarter of 1997. (R. at 139). 
8. Hodges continued to want to work on his marriage and still hoped for 
reconciliation including up and through the time of their last counseling session in 
the first quarter of 1997. (R. at 186 (Hodges deposition page 157)). 
9. Linda Hodges filed for divorce in late January of 1997. (R. at 4). 
10. In the first quarter of 1997, Hodges and his wife decided to sell their 
home. The home sold in May or June of 1997. (R. at 117, 150-51) 
11. In the summer of 1997, Hodges began dating another woman, six 
months after he and Linda Hodges separated for the last time in January of 1997. 
(R. at 117, 138). 
12. Throughout the divorce process, Hodges remained hopeful and 
believed there was a chance he and his wife could reconcile. (R. at 189 (Hodges 
deposition at 311-12)). 
13. Hodges further testified in his deposition that his wife and Howell 
denied having an affair until they were deposed in October of 1997 in the context 
of the Hodges' divorce proceedings. (R. at 189 (Hodges deposition at 314)); (see 
also R. at 4, f 20). 
14. The Hodges' divorce was finalized on February 4, 1998. (R. at 170). 
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15. Hodges' complaint in this matter was filed with the Third District 
Court on October 20, 1998. (R. at 1). 
V. Summary of Argument 
The one-year statute governing the tort of seduction does not apply to AOA 
claims. In fact, AOA claims are elementally different in every way from the tort 
of seduction. Utah case law and statutes clearly define the act of seduction as 
requiring the enticement of an unmarried individual under the age of 18 to have 
unlawful sexual intercourse. See, e.g.. Bowers v. Carter. 59 Utah 249. 250-51. 
202 P. 1093,1094-95 (Utah 1921); see also Utah Code Ann.§§ 78-11-4, 5 (1996). 
By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically stated that the tort of AOA 
does not include sexual contact or intercourse as a necessary element of the claim. 
see Norton v. Macfarlane. 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, in seduction, 
the person seduced must be under the age of 18 and must not be married. In AOA 
settings, marriage is a necessary element. 
Also, the tort of AOA is much more akin to personal injury or wrongful 
death claims, both of which are typically governed by statutes of limitation of at 
least two years, and as many as four years. On at least two occasions, the Utah 
Supreme Court has compared the tort of AOA with wrongful death claims, and it 
equated the two claims together by noting that each involve the loss of society, 
10 
love, companionship, protection and affection. See Norton. 818 P.2d at 11-12; see 
also Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1216 (Utah 1983). 
Finally, even if the one-year statute of limitations for seduction applies to 
Hodges' AOA claim, the trial court erred when it construed the disputed facts as to 
when Hodges' AOA cause of action accrued in favor of Howell, the moving party. 
More specifically, Hodges set forth facts in his opposing memorandum that, when 
construed in a light most favorable to him (as required by law), created a genuine 
issue of material fact as to when his AOA cause of action accrued for statute of 
limitations purposes. Hodges established facts demonstrating that he still held out 
hope for reconciliation and was willing to work together with his estranged wife to 
repair the damage to their marriage and raise their children together as husband 
and wife, even after Linda Hodges filed for divorce. (R. at 168-71). The law 
encourages reconciliation and any efforts that may preserve the marital 
relationship. The law further presumes that there is always a possibility of 
reconciliation up until the divorce is finalized. To force Hodges to file a 
complaint for AOA while still holding out hope for reconciliation with his wife, 
which would occur if a one-year statute of limitations applies, would defeat the 
clear public policy favoring reconciliation and would force Hodges to risk losing 
the opportunity to reconcile by prematurely filing a lawsuit. 
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VI. Argument 
A. HODGES' CLAIM FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS IS NOT 
GOVERNED BY THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
FOR SEDUCTION. 
Howell's summary judgment motion hinged on the flawed presumption that 
the tort of AOA is subject to the one-year statute of limitations found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-29(4), and on the misguided inferences Howell draws from Hodges' 
deposition testimony as to when the AOA was complete and a cause of action for 
the same accrued. As demonstrated below, § 78-12-29(4) does not govern the tort 
of AOA and Howell's reliance on that section is wholly misplaced. Instead, 
Hodges' AOA claim is governed by Utah's four-year residual statute of 
limitations.4 
1. The tort of AOA is not a specified tort under the one-
year statute of limitations found at §78-12-29(4), and 
the tort of seduction is not at all related to the tort of 
AOA. 
Title 78, Chapter 12 of the Utah Code establishes various statutes of 
limitation applicable to the commencement of civil actions. The statute of 
limitations relied on by Howell is found within Article 2 of Chapter 12. It 
establishes a one-year statute of limitations for specific enumerated torts: 
4Hodges does not concede that his AOA cause of action cannot survive a one-year 
statute of limitation. In fact, there are sufficient facts creating a genuine dispute as to 
when Hodges' cause of action for AOA accrued ~ even if this Court concludes that 
Utah's one-year statute of limitations for seduction applies to Hodges' AOA claim. 
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An action may be brought within one year: 
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state; 
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given 
to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the 
statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation; 
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a 
forfeiture or penalty to the state; 
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction: 
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner 
arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process; 
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property 
caused by a mob or riot; 
(7) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following 
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits 
the time for action to four-years, under Section 25-6-10; or 
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29 (1998 Supp.) (emphasis added). The tort of AOA is 
not enumerated or described whatsoever in § 78-12-29. Notwithstanding that 
obvious fact, Howell relied on subsection (4) of § 78-12-29 in his Motion for 
Summary Judgment and argued that the tort of AOA is akin to the tort of 
seduction. The trial court agreed. However, the fact of the matter is that seduction 
has very little, if anything, in common with AOA. 
AOA is an intentional tort against the person. See Nelson v. Jacobsen. 
669 P.2d 1207, 1217 (Utah 1983): see also Norton. 818 P.2d at 10. Aplaintiff 
alleging AOA must be prepared to demonstrate three necessary elements in order 
to present a prima facia claim for AOA. First, he or she must establish that they 
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had a happy marriage and that genuine love and affection existed between them. 
Second, an AOA plaintiff must prove that the love and affection existing in the 
marriage was alienated and destroyed. Third, he or she must show that the 
wrongful and malicious acts of the defendant produced and brought about the loss 
and alienation of the love and affection that existed in the marriage, and that the 
defendant's conduct was the controlling cause of the alienation. See Nelson. 669 
P.2datl218. 
Seduction, on the other hand, is a cause of action that accrues with the 
seducer having carnal knowledge of the victim. The Utah Supreme Court defines 
seduction as follows: 
The act of seducing; enticement to wrongdoing; specifically the 
offense of inducing a woman to consent to unlawful sexual intercourse, 
by enticements which overcome her scruples; the wrong or crime of 
persuading a woman to surrender her chastity. . . the word 'seduced,' 
when applied to the conduct of a man toward a woman, has a defined 
and well-understood meaning; and a charge that defendant 'seduced, 
debauched, and carnally knew' plaintiff is tantamount to saying that he 
used some undue influence, artifice, deceit, fraud, or made some 
promise to induce the plaintiff to surrender her chastity and virtue to 
him. 
Bowers v. Carter. 59 Utah 249, 250-51, 202 P. 1093, 1094-95 (Utah 1921) 
(citations omitted). This definition plainly demonstrates the significant 
differences between the tort of seduction and the tort of AOA. First, the tort of 
seduction requires that "sexual intercourse" occur. However, there is nothing 
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inherent in the tort of AOA requiring sexual contact to be part of the act or acts 
upon which an AOA claim is founded. See Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1216 (Utah 1983). 
In Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court made it very clear that the tort of AOA is not 
about sex; nor is sex a necessary element to the cause of action. Instead, the 
underlying basis for the tort of AOA is built "on the premise that each spouse has 
a valuable interest in the marriage relationship, including its intimacy, 
companionship, support, duties, and affection." Id. 
In Norton v. Macfarlane. 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized this point in even greater detail. 
[T]he tort of AOA protects the marriage relationship from a 
variety of assaults by third persons, whether extramarital sexual affairs 
are involved or not. Sexual misconduct is only one means of destroying 
spousal affections. The gist of the tort is the protection of the love, 
society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a 
marriage and give rise to the unique bonding that occurs in a successful 
marriage. 
Id, at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, the tort of AOA was established to 
protect the marriage from third party attacks. Unlike claims for seduction, an 
AOA cause of action does not require that the attack on the marriage include an 
extramarital affair or sexual relations. 
The tort of seduction is further distinguishable from the tort of AOA. As 
defined in Bowers, seduction typically involves enticing a person to surrender his 
or her virtue and chastity through "artifice, deceit, [or] fraud " Bowers. 202 P. 
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at 1094-95. Here, there was no trickery, deceit, fraud or artifice in Howell's 
actions. Instead, Howell made a bold, obvious and premeditated play for the 
affections of Hodges' wife and she voluntarily and knowingly chose to accept 
those advances in spite of her marital vows to Hodges.5 
Furthermore, neither Hodges nor Linda Hodges could, under any 
circumstances relevant to this litigation, bring a claim for seduction. Instead, 
under Utah law, seduction must involve a minor, unmarried individual. The 
seduction statute states as follows. 
An unmarried individual, under 18 years of age at the time of seduction, 
may prosecute as plaintiff an action therefor, and may recover therein 
such damages, actual or exemplary as are assessed in favor of such 
individual. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-4 (1996); see also § 78-11-5 (1996) (permitting parents or 
guardians to prosecute claims for the seduction of minor children). 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has already cautioned against equating the 
tort of AOA with that of seduction. In Norton, the Utah Supreme Court agreed 
that "it is by no means certain that all four actions [AOA, seduction, criminal 
conversation and breach of promise to marry] should be lumped together for 
identical treatment." Norton. 818 P.2d at 13, n. 9. In fact, the Utah Supreme 
5Hodges did not plead the tort of seduction in his complaint. Had he done so, the 
cause of action for seduction would have accrued with the last act of seduction. See 
Slawek v. Stroh. 215 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Wis. 1974). 
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Court discussed the tort of wrongful death ~ which is subject to a two-year statute 
of limitations — in terms strikingly familiar to those defining AOA. 
It is the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and 
affection which usually constitute the heart of the [wrongful death] 
action. Stated somewhat differently, this Court has stated that recovery 
may be had for "the loss of affection, counsel and advice, the loss of 
deceased's care and solicitude for the welfare of his or her family and 
the loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of [the]deceased would 
have received...." 
Id at 11-12 (emphasis added). 
In Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court evaluated the claims of a defendant who 
sought a ruling abolishing the AOA cause of action. Nelson. 669 P.2d at 1207. In 
its decision to preserve the rights of a victimized spouse to sue for AOA, the Utah 
Supreme Court felt that AOA claims deserve as much protection as the cause of 
action for wrongful death. 
Our wrongful death statutes have long recognized the value of a 
plaintiffs interest in his or her relationships with family members. 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7. We have repeatedly sustained a 
plaintiffs right to recover for the loss of society, love, companionship, 
protection and affection which usually constitute the heart of the 
[wrongful death] action. The marital relationship is entitled to as much 
protection as these. 
Id at 1215 (emphasis added). It follows that if a person victimized by the 
wrongful death of his or her spouse is entitled to two years to bring suit, so too 
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should a victim who loses his or her spouse as a result of the alienation of his or 
her affections by a third party have at least equal time to pursue his or her claims.6 
Furthermore, not only is the tort of AOA not enumerated in section 78-12-
29, this statute also is not the exclusive statute of limitation for all intentional 
torts. Rather, there are numerous statutes establishing different - and usually 
longer - limitations periods for various intentional torts. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 
78-12-25(2) (establishing a four-year statute of limitation for actions based on the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act); 78-12-25.1 (establishing a four-year statute of 
limitation for actions involving the sexual abuse of a child); 78-12-26 
(establishing a three-year statute of limitation for actions based on fraud or injury 
to property); 78-12-28 (establishing a two-year statute of limitation for wrongful 
death actions caused both by negligence and intentional conduct). 
6
 In May of 1997, the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (1997) 
which specifically established the right of an individual to sue for loss of consortium 
resulting from personal injury sustained by his or her spouse as a result of the wrongful or 
negligent actions of a third person. Under this statute, the spouse's consortium claims are 
subject to the same statute of limitations that applies to the other spouses' personal injury 
claims. Id. at § 30-2-11(3). Thus, if the spouse's personal injuries were caused by 
wrongful death or medical malpractice, the statute of limitations for the consortium 
claims would be two years. See idL at § 78-12-28(2) (establishing two-year limitations 
period for wrongful death); and § 78-14-4(1) (establishing two-year limitations period for 
medical malpractice claims). Personal injuries arising out of negligent acts, such as 
automobile accidents, slip and falls, and other intentional acts not covered by Section 78-
12-29(4), would subject consortium claims to the four-year residual statute of limitations 
found at Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25 (1996). 
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In short, the torts of AOA and seduction are vastly different and clearly 
unrelated to each other. That being the case, it is disingenuine and misleading for 
Howell to attempt to lump together the two claims for statute of limitations 
purposes. Furthermore, as is demonstrated below, there are other statutes of 
limitation which bear a greater and more logical fit to Hodges' AOA claim.7 
2. The tort of AOA is subject to the four-year statute of 
limitations found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 
because it is not specifically enumerated in § 78-12-
29. 
As argued above, the tort of AOA is not enumerated in the one-year statute 
of limitations found at § 78-12-29 and is not sufficiently related to the tort of 
seduction (which is specifically enumerated in § 78-12-29) to warrant lumping the 
two together for statute of limitations purposes. This leaves the question of which 
statute of limitations applies if the one-year limitation period of § 78-12-29 does 
not. 
7
 In his motion for summary judgment, Howell cites the case of Tolman v. K-Mart 
Enterprises of Utah. Inc.. 650 P.2d 1127, 1128 (Utah 1997) in support of his argument 
that AOA is related to the tort of seduction and should be subject to the one-year statute 
of limitations that applies to seduction. In Tolman. the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
tort of false arrest is subject to the same statute of limitations that applies to the tort of 
false imprisonment because false arrest is "but an aspect of false imprisonment...." Id. 
In other words, false arrest is typically a sub-part or a component of false imprisonment if 
not itself a form of false imprisonment. Here, AOA is not a component of seduction, nor 
are the two torts in any way related. The only similarity between the two is that sexual 
intercourse is only one of many possible causes of the AOA but is not the only or 
required cause, whereas sexual intercourse is a necessary element claim for seduction. 
Howell's reliance on Tolman is therefore misplaced. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has provided on-point analysis which 
demonstrates that the four-year residual statute of limitations found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25(3) should apply to the tort of AOA. Section 78-12-25(3) 
represents the Utah Legislature's efforts to provide a residual or "catch-all" statute 
of limitations for any causes of action which are not otherwise explicitly 
enumerated in other provisions establishing limitations periods. Subsection (3) of 
Utah's residual statue of limitations applies to all actions "for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law." Id The Utah Supreme Court explained the use of this 
catch-all provision in Olsen v. Hooley. 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993). 
A cause of action, such as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, that is not subject to a specific statutory limitations period is 
governed by the residual four-year limitations period found in § 78-12-
25(3). Intentional infliction of emotional distress, although traditionally 
viewed as an intentional tort, is not one of the torts enumerated in § 78-
12-29(4) that have a one-year limitations period, and therefore falls 
within the residual statute of limitations. 
Id. at 1347 n. 1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Retherford v. 
AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992) (comparing AOA with 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because both often involve "a 
series of wrongful acts over a substantial period of time . . . " ) . 
The above-analysis is plainly demonstrative of Hodges' position in this 
case. Just as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ('TIED") is not 
enumerated in § 78-12-29, so too is the intentional tort of AOA omitted from 
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reference therein. Thus, while Hodges concedes that AOA is an intentional tort, as 
is IIED and seduction, AOA is no more related to seduction than any of the other 
intentional torts subject to other longer limitation periods. Therefore, because the 
tort of AOA is not assigned to a specific statute of limitation it is necessarily 
governed by the four-year "catch all" limitations period found in § 78-12-25(3). 
Courts in other states have taken a similar approach and held that AOA 
claims are governed by residual or general statutes of limitation. See Schwartz v. 
Valinskv. 294 N.E.2d 446,447 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973) (general limitations period 
for torts applies to claims for AOA); see also Gibson v. Gibson. 402 S.W.2d 647, 
650 (Ark. 1968) (one-year statute of limitations for false imprisonment, slander 
and assault which does not mention AOA claims does not apply; instead, five-year 
statute of limitations for torts in general applies to claims of AOA); Smith v. 
Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141 (Ohio 1918) (holding that four year general or catch-all 
statute of limitations governing claims "not arising on contract" applied to AOA 
claims); Farrow v. Roderique. 224 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. App. 1949) (applying general 
statute of limitations of five years to AOA claims in the absence of a statute 
specifically enumerating claims for AOA); Bassett v. Bassett. 20 111. App. 543 
(111. 1886); Woodman v. Goodrich. 234 Wis. 565,291 N.W. 768, 769 (Wis. 
1940) (six-year limitation period for claims not arising in contract or not otherwise 
expressly provided for by statute applies to AOA claims). 
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The Gibson court noted the common and well-reasoned rule that courts 
should be reluctant to "apply a statute of limitations to actions not specifically 
enumerated therein." Gibson. 402 S.W.2d at 648. Hodges therefore requests this 
Court to rule consistent with the decision in the Olsen case and rule that claims for 
AOA are governed by the residual four-year statute of limitations found at Utah 
Code Ann. §78-25-12(3). 
B. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO WHEN 
HODGES' AOA CLAIM ACCRUED WHICH PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Wineear v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). In ruling on summary 
judgment motions, trial courts are advised to view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. See kL 
Howell argues that Hodges' cause of action for AOA accrued no later than 
January of 1997. Assuming this to be true, for the sake of argument, Howell's 
application of a one-year statute of limitation would clearly bar Hodges' 
complaint which was filed one year and nearly nine months later (October 1998). 
However, even if the one-year statute of limitations applies, Hodges' deposition 
testimony demonstrates that material issues of fact exist as to when the alienation 
of the affections of Hodges' wife was complete. As defined by law, the statute of 
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limitations for AOA begins to run "when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when 
love and affection are finally lost." Retherford. 844 P.2d at 975.8 
Specifically, while Hodges admits that the date of January 20, 1997 was a 
damaging step in the decline of his marriage with Linda Hodges, he also states 
several times in his deposition that he felt there was always a chance of 
reconciliation so long as he was married to Linda Hodges. Indeed, Hodges held 
out hope for such and was willing to try and salvage his marriage up until the time 
when the Hodges5 divorce was finalized in February of 1998. See Hodges' 
Response to Howell's Statement of Facts (R. at 168-71) and Hodges' Additional 
Statement of Facts above. Moreover, Howell cannot point to any fact which 
demonstrates that as of January 20, 1997, Linda Hodges' affections for Hodges 
8
 Retherford did not involve claims for AOA. However, in discussing the 
application of the statute of limitations for acts which in their aggregate form constitute a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), the Retherford court referred 
to case law from other jurisdictions which recognize that like IIED, AOA claims arise 
from a "series of wrongful acts over a substantial period time," and "that the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when love and 
affection are finally lost." Retherford. 844 P.2d at 975. Therefore, while Utah courts 
have not directly addressed the question of when a claim or cause of action for AOA 
accrues, the above dicta in Retherford demonstrates that AOA and IIED claims are very 
similar in nature. Both are not explicitly included in any specific statute of limitations, 
and both accrue in similar fashion. Hodges' position that his AOA claim also falls within 
the residual four-year statute of limitations is therefore consistent and in harmony with 
this Court's analysis both in Retherford and in Olsen and should be treated in similar 
fashion for statute of limitations purposes. 
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and vice versa were "finally lost." In fact, Hodges did not file for divorce because 
of his desire to give reconciliation a chance. 
Furthermore, "the law presumes that there is always a possibility of 
reconciliation of husband and wife and this the law encourages." Gibson. 424 
S.W.2d 871, 874 (Ark. 1968). This same principle was recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Oldrovd. 1 Utah 2d 362, 372-74,267 P.2d 759, 767-
68 (Utah 1954). In Wilson, the Utah Supreme Court sustained as proper the trial 
court's decision to issue a jury instruction that stated that "so long as the marriage 
status continues between a husband and wife, the law presumes that there is a 
possibility of reconciliation even though they have become estranged or have had 
marital differences." Id at 1 Utah 2d at 373, 267 P.2d at 767. The primary cause 
of action alleged in Wilson was AOA. 
The earliest Hodges may have felt that Linda Hodges' love was finally lost 
was October 27, 1997 when Linda Hodges and Howell both revealed the extent of 
their emotional relationship and for the first time admitted that their relationship 
included sexual relations. (R. at 189 (Hodges deposition at 314)); (see also R. at 
4, T| 20). These facts were revealed in Linda Hodges' and Howell's deposition 
testimony in the divorce proceedings, and nearly four months before the Hodges' 
divorce was finalized. 
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In general, "[deliberate concealment by a defendant of the plaintiffs cause 
of action will toll the statute of limitations." Loomer v. Rittinger. 789 S.W.2d 16, 
17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, precisely when Hodges felt the alienation of 
his wife's affections was complete is a factual question that must be decided by 
the trier of fact. See Andreini v. Hultgress. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) ("The 
governing law is clear. The point at which a person reasonably should know that 
he or she has suffered a legal injury is a question of fact"); see also Gibson. 424 
S.2d at 875 (holding that AOA claim accrued sometime between the parties' 
separation and final divorce but the question of precisely when the claim accrued 
was a question for the jury). 
Hodges does not deny having suspicions or knowing that his wife's 
relationship with Howell was damaging their marriage. However, Howell's 
arguments in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, if accurate, would 
force someone in Hodges' position to choose between two possible courses of 
action: Pursue an AOA claim before all hope is lost or the divorce is finalized and 
thereby lose all hope for reconciliation, or, continue to give reconciliation a 
chance and avoid damaging that prospect by filing a lawsuit. Put in other terms, 
the choice Howell would have Hodges make is an unfair one. Sue now and avoid 
the risk of the short statute of limitations running, or risk losing your cause of 
action for AOA in order to give reconciliation every chance of succeeding. 
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Such choices are not only unfair, they are also unjust. The law always 
prefers and encourages settlement and reconciliation, not litigation. Many 
marriages survive and remain intact despite the infidelity of one spouse. The law 
should be construed to allow Hodges every opportunity to hold out hope and 
pursue reconciliation prior to proceeding down a course of action that would harm 
those opportunities. Many divorces, including the Hodges9 divorce, take more 
time to fully resolve, one way or the other, than the one-year limitations period 
Howell would have this Court apply to Hodges' AOA claim. Four years gives 
every would-be-AOA claimant sufficient time to pursue every avenue of 
reconciliation before the law penalizes him or her and prevents him or her from 
seeking legal recourse against the offending third party. 
In short, regardless of which statute of limitations applies to Hodges' claim 
for AOA, the question of when his cause of action for the same accrued is a 
question of fact for the jury to resolve, not the trial court. The trial court therefore 
erred in resolving such disputed factual issues in favor of Howell when it granted 
Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE 
DETAILED FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT AND OUTLINE ITS 
DECISION THAT HODGES' AOA CLAIMS ACCRUED MORE 
THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE FILING OF HIS COMPLAINT 
Rule 52(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the trial court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon." 
Here, the trial court utterly failed to provide any findings of fact or provide any 
discussion which would give any insight as to how the trial court reached its 
conclusion that Hodges' AOA claim accrued more than one year prior to the filing 
of his complaint. This violates the clear mandate of this state's appellate courts. 
More specifically, a trial court's factual findings must contain enough detail 
to reveal the reasoning process undertaken by the trial court in reaching its 
decision. Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Advance Reports 45,46 (Utah 
App. 1999). Put in other terms, the Court's factual findings must be articulated in 
such a manner as to allow the basis of the ultimate conclusion to be understood. 
Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 2.Pd 1234 1242 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.CT. 1803 
fl999): see also Rucker v. Dalton 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
In short, the trial court's minute entry and ruling, and the subsequent order 
signed by the trial court all fail to refer to any facts upon which the trial court 
relied in determining when Hodges' AOA claim accrued or when the affections of 
his wife were finally lost and alienated. The trial court further did not provide any 
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discussion or findings that explain how it dealt with the disputed issues of fact 
presented by Hodges in his opposition to Howell's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or why the trial court felt that those facts were insufficient to create a 
genuine dispute as to the material facts associated with Howell's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, because this Court is not in a position to understand or delve into 
the basis for the trial court's ruling on these factual issues, a remand is in order. 
However, this issue and the alleged error of the trial court to make factual findings 
is clearly moot in the event this Court determines that the statute of limitations for 
AOA claims is four years rather than one year as argued by Howell. Therefore, 
Hodges submits this particular argument in the alternative only in the event that 
this Court determines that a one-year statute of limitations applies to Hodges' 
claims. 
VII. Conclusion 
The trial court erred in applying the one-year statute of limitations for 
seduction to Hodges' alienation of affection claims. Instead, the four-year 
residual statute of limitations applies and Hodges' complaint was filed well within 
the requisite four-year period. Additionally, the trial court erred when it resolved 
the factual dispute as to when Hodges' AOA claim accrued in favor of Howell 
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who was the moving party. Such questions constitute genuine issues of material 
fact to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Hodges respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision 
granting Howell's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case to the trial 
court for a jury trial. 
Dated this day of November 1999. 
BENNETT TU&LLER JOHNSON & DEERE, LLC 
Barry N. Johnson 
Daniel L. Steele 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Ryan Q. Hodges 
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Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REESE S. HOWELL, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LINDA M. HODGES, 
Ihiicl I 'art v Defendant. 
r \< M l l I ( I I M ' l ' l \ l 
Civil No. 980910505MI 
JluiiU: i' • • 
mi I 1 I r is lierebv I«I\ H I I hat piainti lf and appe l lan t , R y a n Q. H o d g e s , b y and th rough 
his unde r s igned counsel Bennett Tueller Johnson & D e e r e , 
r i i i ! i the final order and judgment entered in this matter o r iune if>. : W i , v the Honorable 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson of the i h •.: 
The appeal is taken from the final order and judgment granting Defendant Reese 
Howell'^ Motion for SUP.-. : - :• a^ib g rounds , a copy o; w inch is 
attached for reference. 
I »ATH I" i us /...^r(hi\ "I iiiih , i»i")9. 
B E N N E T T T U E L L E R J OHlVV ) \ ,M l ^ L R h , i LC 
<h^T 
Barry N . Johnson 
Daniel L. Steele 
Thomas B. Price 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
1 * 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / c — day of July, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
posl'iiv |)ii'|i;iiii ,i 11 in' ,inil i i ii i I'I 'i i up HI 11 if loicgoiiig [Mil ¥ APPEAL to: 
Erik A. Christiansen 
James T. Blanch 
Angie Nelson 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
'v-.Ii 5 -tf-rCitv. TTtaj, -,-.145-0898 




( ' u U Al'KIvAl. REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. 
58(2). 
Limitation of Actions <£= C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§ 33 et seq. 
"i'H" 1 ii-2Ji VI1' i (In in four y e a r s . 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchan-
dise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last-
payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections 
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise prov1111>iI I<11 In I 
History: L. 1951, ch . 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 110. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-
tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3); 
and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions, 
§ 76-10-925. 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Assigned cause of action. 
Breach of fiduciary duty. 
Conflict of laws. 





Excessive freight charges. 
Extension of period. 
Federal civil rights actions. 









Oral modification of written contract. 
Other claims for relief. 
— Federal claim. 
— Negligence. 




Pleading and proof. 
Product liability. 
Purpose of section. 
Quieting title. 
Recovery of payments under note. 
Reformation of instrument. 
Relation back of complaints. 
Relief not otherwise provided for. 
Restraining actions. 
Running of statute. 
— Payment of settlement obligation. 
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes. 
Taking for public use. 
Tax paid under protest. 
Tolling. 
— Class actions. 
Torts. 
Trustees. 
LIMITATION OF \ c n o N S 78 ] 2-29 
C ' » ; -'KKK\*( r.S 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 22A Am. Jur. 2d Death § 56 
et seq.; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions 
§ 103; 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and 
Employees § 548 et seq.; 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sher-
iffs, Police and Constables §§ 236 to 240. 
C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions 
§§ 69, 75. 
A.L.R. — Right to amend pending personal 
injury action by including action for wrongful 
death after s tatute of limitations has run 
against independent death action, 71 A.L.R.Sd 
933. 
Time of discovery as affecting running of 
statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 
49 A.L.R.4th 972. 
Medical malpractice: statute of limitations in 
wrongful death action based on medical mal-
practice, 70 A.L.R.4th 535. 
Fraudulent concealment of cause of action for 
wrongful death as affecting period of limita-
tions, 88A.L.R.4th851. 
Key Numbers . - Limitation of Actions <§= 
31, 34(3). 
7 8 . 1 2 . 29 . Within one year. 
An action may be brought within one year: 
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state; 
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to 
an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the statute 
imposing it prescribes a different limitation; 
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a 
forfeiture or penalty to the state; 
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction; 
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested 
or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process; 
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property 
caused by a mob or riot; 
(7) on a claim for relief or a Cciuv-; ..*". -i im-u.-i-iwii,., MTIIH. s 
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fr;u,*;-i < u . 4er Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), -\\ .••:= fie situations limits the 
time for action to four years, i n .<j - '•">-£- 1 n m 
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2). 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943., 
Supp. , 104-12-29; L. 1988, ch . 59, § 15; 1989, 
ch. 22, § 50; 1996, ch . 79, § 113. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-
tion" in the beginning of Subsections (1) to (6); 
and made stylisic changes. 
Cross-References . — Libel, Title 45, Chap-
ter 2. 
Riot, response and recovery, Title 63, Chapter 
5a. 
Seduction, §§ 78-11-4, 78-11-5. 
\< VYV^ DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for penalty or forfeiture. 
Dismissal of action. 
— Institution of second action. 
Excessive freight charges. 
"False arrest." 
Federal civil rights actions. 
Foreign statute. 
— Stockholder's liability, 
Libel 
Pleading. 





Running of statute. 
— Delinquent taxes. 
Filing of return. 
— Fraud. 
Discovery. 
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